



Record of Interview

Project Title and Code: SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan**Date: February 2, 2015****Interviewees:** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**SIGAR Attendees: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant****Location: Berlin****Purpose:** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**Non-attribution Basis:** Yes ☒ No ☐**Recorded:** Yes ☐ No ☒**Recording File Record Number:****Prepared By: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert, Consultant****Summary of Key Discussion:**

- The US was quite influential in letting President Karzai get away with things based on stabilization; Pentagon has number one priority; 2001-05 dominated by US forces; Funding for getting things done; Not helpful to fight corruption; Whatever happened was dominated by military logic; Anybody outside was not in the picture; AID gets Pentagon orders; Tactics without strategy is a true way to fail; Need civil side as full partners; Some good things have been done, but no sustainability; PRTs substituted government ministries; Head of PRT was more NB for some local people;
- In 2010 there was a need to group priorities under a development framework; Pressure was created; Kabul Bank started it; Really what led into Tokyo; Run-up to Tokyo intensified donor activity from talking to action; Joint discussion; Good exercise; Informal meetings before SOM in July 2013;
- TMAF was good; Need to further develop TMAF approach; Very NB that 5+3 be honest about how approach should work; Donors need to have united front; No nonsense basis then things can work; Afghans need to deliver; Have not lived up to promises; Some TMAF demands were easy and created frustration that they were not fulfilled; Level of political will, not of ability; Past troop levels guaranteed support, but that's changed dramatically; Afghans are now competing for resources; Germany did exercise conditionality with 20 million Euro in 2015; Has to be clear that action will be taken; Change in US approach; Americans were strict and demanding; but now with lead up to elections US was soft; Too soft; Wanted to avoid any sense of burdening new government; US was reserved on London;
- Cooperation has been quite good; Regular meetings; UNAMA and MoF chaired; Key donors met as well; More or less pulling in the same direction; Watched US position; Never felt that the US was forcing donors; Always tried to have mutual solutions; While there was a good level of talking there was little operational coordination; Coordination with Afghan government occurred in various fora; Cluster groups; MoF led process; Right people were not at the table; Lack of other Ministries; 5+3 group meets in Kabul and HQ; 5+3 was meeting regularly at HQ level in lead up to London; Worked well because high level of trust amongst donors; Allowed for framework of donor coordination;
- Elections have taken a long time to sort things out; Country is at a standstill; Large budget deficit; NB for Ghani to clean gov't structure; Get it right; Justice issue; Sub-national governance and administration;
- ARTF is key variable for coordination; ARTF was most effective; good WB administration and structures;

Follow-up:

- None.